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Abstract 
Models that apply to negotiation are based 
on different perspectives that range from 
the relationship between the actors, game 
theory or the steps in a procedure. This 
research proposes a model of negotiation 
scenarios that considers three factors 
(time, relevance and control), which are 
displayed as the most important in a 
negotiation. These factors interact with 
each other and create different scenarios 
for each of the actors involved in a nego- 
tiation. The proposed model not only facili- 
tates the creation of a negotiation strategy 
but also an ideal choice of effective tactics. 
Resumen 
Los modelos que se aplican a la negocia- 
ción se basan en diferentes perspectivas, 
que van desde la relación entre los ac- 
tores, la teoría de juegos o los pasos de 
un procedimiento. En esta investigación 
se propone un modelo de escenarios de 
negociación que considera tres factores 
(tiempo, pertinencia y control), que se 
muestran como los más importantes en 
una negociación. Estos factores interac- 
túan entre sí y crean diferentes escenarios 
para cada uno de los actores involucrados 
en una negociación. El modelo propuesto 
no sólo facilita la creación de una estra- 
tegia de negociación, sino también una 
opción ideal de tácticas efectivas. 
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Introduction 
 
There are many ways to solve differences between actors; among those we 
find regulations, courts, markets, and negotiations (Raiffa, 1982; Kersten, 
Michalowski, Szpakowicz, & Koperczak, 1991) The negotiation approach to 
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the resolution of differences should not be perceived as something wrong, 
according to Rao (1992), since it is a common occurrence in life Negotiation 
involves making several different decisions (Raiffa, Richardson, & Metcalfe, 
2002) and therefore it is a complex process Furthermore, this complexity is 
not only due to the number of variables and the interaction between them, 
but also to other features, such as unpredictability and interaction between 
the actors (Wheeler & Morris, 2002)  
Most negotiation models focus on the actors involved in the decision ma- 
king process and not on the possible scenarios under which decisions are 
made Golden (2008) proposes a Counsel Model, that suggests hiring a person 
to help and work collaboratively with the counterpart; such a model is ba- 
sed on case studies presented in the trucking industry of the United States 
when an accident happens Grump (2007) proposes the Temporal Model of 
Negotiation Linkage Dynamics based on case studies of bilateral negotiations 
among three governments (United States, Singapore and Australia between 
2000 and 2004), this model focuses on the interdependence of the diffe- 
rent relationships generated during, before and after the negotiation Finally, 
another model based on the relationship of the parties involved in the nego- 
tiation process is the one studied by Fells (2013), who develops a model made 
by Halpert (2010) known as Negotiation Success. An Application of the Halpert et 
al. Path Model, its main contribution being cooperation between the involved 
parties  
Negotiation might also be approached from the point of view of game 
theory, which studies the strategies followed by the actors, especially in oligo- 
polistic deals In such a competition, players are assumed to be in the same 
position and therefore they should act according to the decisions taken by 
their counterpart as a result of the actions carried out regarding the amou- 
nt of product (Cournot, 1838), price (Edgeworth, 1925), or differentiation 
(Chamberlin, 1937), to name a few of the most important Sebenius (1992) 
mentions that game theory is useful in repetitive negotiations where situa- 
tions and variables are clear and structured, when both players act rationally 
and therefore the results of the interactions can be predicted However, in 
reality and most of the cases, negotiation agents do not decide rationally but 
they rather do it based on emotions or interests (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Lax and 
Sebenius, 1986; Bazerman and Neale, 1992)  
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Besides game theory, there are other studies that propose models of re- 
solution of negotiations, whose application is broader from the perspective 
that they use a higher number of variables and assume the complexity of 
the different deals, see, e g Fisher and Ury (1981), Raiffa (1982), and Lax 
Sebenius (1986), Kersten (1991), and Bazerman and Neale (1992), among 
others Most of the models studied in the literature are based on a series of 
steps that, in the end, are represented in a procedure such as the one from 
Adair and Brett (2005). In such a study, they propose a model where the first 
step is the one they call relational positioning, which refers to knowing and iden- 
tifying the position of each of the parties in the negotiation; the second step 
is to identify the problem; the third one is to generate feasible solutions and 
finally, to reach an agreement. 
In this paper we propose a model that facilitates setting negotiation stra- 
tegies and tactics, under different scenarios, resulting from the interaction of 
some important variables In the following section we show the factors that 
are considered in order to define the propose Model of Negotiation Scenarios 
(hereafter mns) These variables are time in which the negotiation takes place, 
control that each of actors shows over the other, and the relevance of what is 
being negotiated  
 
Factors of the Model of Negotiation Scenarios 
 
Influence of time 
 
Time is a key factor in a company; Bhatia (2012) states that the importance of 
time, risk and financial return determine the value of a firm. Time is also use- 
ful in other business tasks Seshadri and Shapira (2001) state: “Time is one of 
the more salient constraints on managerial behavior” Negotiation is one of 
many business tasks with time as a constraint Time is a measure factor use- 
ful to establish whether the results of a negotiation are positive or negative 
Lawson (2001) has found that some companies do not measure efficiency in 
the short term but in the long run For other companies, the perspective of 
time is contrary to that mentioned by Lawson Sayman and Önçüler (2009) 
study the term time inconsistency, which means larger and long-term results are 
preferred to smaller results but in a short time  However this statement is 
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only maintained for a certain period; as time goes by, the preferences may 
change to smaller but short-term results; time inconsistency, therefore, can also 
play a role in the preference of results  
Besides the preference between short-term and long-term, there might be 
other temporal regions, according to Zauberman and Lynch (2006) Thus, in 
a negotiation, the results may be presented and occur in three different time 
regions: the present, the near future and the distant future We understand 
the present as a short-term perspective (st), the near future as medium-term (mt), 
and finally the distant future or the long-term (lt)  Furthermore, a negotiator 
may prefer short-term rewards in contrast to his counterpart who can choose 
long-term. The influence of time is important in order to establish a model 
of scenarios in the negotiation and we propose to separate it into the three 
aforementioned perspectives: st, mt and lt  
The time variable that gives the greatest advantage when negotiating is the 
st, and the one that gives the minor advantage is the lt In the long run there 
will be a number of negotiations between the parties involved, just imagine 
that one of the two parties does not need to have a deal in the long term 
but in the short term For example, provider A wants to sell a product X to 
customer B If both of them want to have a long-term relationship they will 
try to cooperate as much as possible and in these circumstances none have a 
relative advantage to each other; however, if client A for some reason is in- 
terested in purchasing product X for only one time, supplier A will cooperate 
as client A will compete, in this deal the disadvantage is for supplier A and 
not for the client B  
 
Level of control and power 
 
The negotiator’s position depends heavily on the ability to influence his cou- 
nterpart; usually, this concept is known as power Garcia (2002) states that a 
negotiation can be won if power is held According to Raiffa (2002) power 
is a multifaceted concept; it can mean different things, such as control of 
information, a competitive advantage, or simply a preferred position Usually 
the weaker parties overestimate the competitive advantage of the powerful 
parties The concept of power has been studied by several authors from di- 
fferent perspectives as to their typology (French, Jr , & Raven, 1959), their in- 
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centives, i. e., for greater organizational position or higher salary (Qian, 1994) 
or by their level of control (Garcia, 2002), where the powerful do not care 
about what their partners argue because they know they hold the full power 
of the negotiation Power is the use of resources to assert one’s opinion and 
its use in a negotiation affects the outcome When one of the parties has 
more bargaining power, he has sufficient capacity to handle his counterpart 
and thus directly influence the result. When both sides have the same amount 
of power, the ability to influence is similar, and when one is lesser, he must 
submit to the more powerful  
For the mns proposed, we consider four levels of power or control ac- 
cording to the economic theory of the market between the supplier and 
the buyer, see, e g Chamberlin (1937), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman 
(1979), Friedman (1985), Fujita (1988) and Krugman and Obstfeld (2006), 
among others. The first level is having full control (fc) of the situation, such 
as in a monopoly If the player doesn’t have absolute control, it will then be 
a duopoly, where there is shared control (sc) and no party has absolute power 
over the other In third place, when the control is shared not only with a cou- 
nterpart but several others who hold the same percentage or capacity of in- 
tervention, we will call this fragmented control (fc), known in economic theory 
like monopolistic competition, see Krugman y Obstfeld (2006). Finally, if the 
player doesn’t have influence over the counterpart who decides the result of 
the negotiation, there is a nonexistent control (nc)  
The actor of a negotiation that has tc of the deal will have a very advanta- 
geous negotiating position with respect to sc, fc or nc A company that is a 
market monopoly has tc and is in a better bargaining position than one who 
is in a market where they share clients with another company and therefore 
is a duopoly Control is lost depending on whether the negotiator has more 
or less market share For example, supplier A is the only vendor that makes 
product X and customer B is one of hundreds of clients who require it for 
their production process In this negotiation the most advantageous position 
will be for supplier A because he will have much greater control than client B 
Both power and time are variables that affect directly a negotiation but 
have different strategic and tactical implications when the product value (real 
or perceived) is different for each one of the actors involved  
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Relevance of the object under negotiation 
 
The reward outcome of a negotiation can benefit the two parties as when the 
parties decide to cooperate, or benefit only one when they decide to compete 
(see, e g , Lax and Sebenius, 1986) Other authors (Farmer and Pecorino, 
2010) suggest such a difference is the result of asymmetric information whe- 
re the reward is unilateral because it benefits only one of the parties, or bi- 
lateral because the benefit is mutual. In a negotiation, each of the parties 
will assign a value to the object depending on their own interests; this is the 
relevance of the object under negotiation  
We consider two levels of relevance of the object under negotiation: vital 
and trivial A product that is vital for one of the parties and trivial for the 
other generates an asymmetry of information (Farmer & Pecorino, 2010) 
and therefore the reward sought by each of the parties is different  
The variable relevance refers to the significance that each party assigns to 
the negotiated object, and is also a function of an advantageous or disadvan- 
tageous position when for one of the parties the negotiated object is trivial 
(not important) and if for its counterpart the object is vital (important), it 
will be in a disadvantageous position For example, a supplier A that has a 
product X and is the only one that produces it, therefore the importance of 
selling or not selling it is vital for him; in contrast if the customer B manu- 
factures product Z with different parts and one of them is the product X 
and also it can be replaced with another type of raw material will acquire the 
importance of little relevance and thus trivial, the client B in these circum- 
stances will have an advantageous position  
Besides time and control, relevance is the last factor of the mns We will 
describe the model and its application in the next section  
 
Description and application of the Model of Negotiation Scenarios 
 
The mns defines a clear structure of the interaction of the three variables 
proposed that facilitates the selection of strategies and tactics to apply in di- 
fferent negotiation scenarios. All negotiations are different and are modified 
according to the circumstances and actors involved These different circum- 
stances require a different treatment of negotiation strategies; in this way, the 
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mns clarifies the scenario of each of the parties and facilitates the definition 
of the strategy to follow  
In a negotiation a player might find himself in one of the three following 
positions advantageous, equal and disadvantageous An advantageous position 
would be when the player has tc of the situation because he might set the 
conditions or if the product is of trivial importance to the player but vital to 
the counterpart and finally if the prospect of reward is st for the player and 
lt for the opponent A position is equal when both the player and the com- 
petitor share control, the product is vital or trivial for both, and both seek 
rewards in the same time perspective The position is of disadvantage when the 
player has no control and the partner has tc, when the product is vital but 
only for the player, and finally when the time perspective is lt for the player 
and st for the counterpart Being able to identify different scenarios for the 
player and its counterpart, the best strategy and tactics for negotiation can 
be inferred  
The best position in a negotiation is of advantageous type, because it is 
what gives greatest benefit and facilitates obtaining the top results. An equal 
position type does not give any advantage to any party, and finally the worst 
position to negotiate is the disadvantageous one because the negotiator in 
this place is a deal taker and not a deal maker  
By considering each of the three factors at their different levels, we can 
obtain different scenarios For this research we will propose 24 (three levels 
of time by four levels of control by two levels of relevance) but they may 
depend on the level of detail that we have of the greater or lesser degree 
given for each of the factors. The first factor of the model is time and refers 
to the timing of the deal that wants to be accomplished The second factor 
refers to the level of control that the negotiator has over the negotiation in 
connection to the counterpart, and the third one is the importance of the 
object being negotiated  
The main contribution intended by this model is the integration and combi- 
nation of the three factors previously described The negotiator must identify 
his position in time and the level of control and the relevance of the negotiated 
object, not only from his own perspective but also from that of his counter- 
part This is the starting point to establish the negotiation strategy Below we 
present two tables where possible examples of applications of the mns  
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Table 1 
Applied example of the mns 
 
Players Time Relevance Control Possible position 
A lt Trivial tc Advantageous 
B st Vital nc Disadvantageous 
 
In Table 1 we show a possible negotiation scenario where actors A and B 
have different positions on each of the factors of the mns; in time A has a 
lt perspective and B a st one, so B has a better time position but lacks the 
relevance of control Secondly, the product traded is trivial for A so it is not 
important, but it is vital to B since it is also part of his subsistence Finally, A 
has tc and B has nc In the real world actor A can be a public firm with 2,000 
employees working in the headquarters’ offices and is the only huge company 
in a town of 30,000 people and in that specific moment is searching for a 
new supplier of stationary products Consider actor A as a retail company 
thus stationary products are not an important raw material or product for 
the core of the business; in the other hand, A is looking for a lt relationship 
because they don’t want to change every month from one supplier to another 
and at the end has tc because he is the only big firm at town; as actor B is an 
importer that has received one freight container of stationary products but is 
the only time he will receive such products, therefore his perspective of time 
is st because he would like to sell everything in one sale, the product is vital 
for him because is small and is the only product he has, and he has nc be- 
cause there are tons of suppliers for stationary products in the zone In this 
situation the advantageous position is for actor A and the disadvantageous 
one for actor B  
 
Table 2 
Applied example of the mns 
 
Players Time Relevance Control Possible position 
A lt Vital nc Disadvantageous 
B st Trivial tc Advantageous 
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In Table 2, actor A is at a disadvantageous position because mainly he is 
an entrepreneur that produces coffee mugs and is looking for his first client, 
being a huge department store For actor A, the seller, the perspective is lt 
because he wants the client to request orders for the next years, of course 
there are hundreds of producers, importers and companies that commercia- 
lize coffee mugs so his control is nc, the coffee mug is vital for him because 
is the only product in his portfolio On the other hand, the buyer, actor B 
is a department store with nationwide locations. For this firm coffee mugs 
are a third kind product so that means it is an accessory and it is not an im- 
portant product for the store, so the object is trivial, the season is summer 
and is proved that coffee mugs’ highest sells are in winter so acquisition for 
buyers of coffee mugs is trivial, and has tc because is the most important 
department store so his market share is high and has tons of coffee mugs 
suppliers Hence actor B is in advantageous position and actor A in a disad- 
vantageous one  
What this model says is that by combining these three factors and having 
the knowledge to be able to segment and use this model well, many ways of 
negotiating can be defined. The mns model applied from the perspectives 
involved in the negotiation such as the buyer and the seller counterpart can 
offer important conclusions, which can serve as a basis for developing a 
strategy  
 
Conclusions 
 
The mns presented considers not only the most important factors such as 
time, relevance and control, but also the interactions that occur between 
them and the actors in a negotiation Knowledge of the different scenarios 
facilitates the establishment of a clear strategy for the best deal; when one of 
the parties does not know where he is situated in the negotiation, he is likely 
to make strategic and tactical errors For example, if the product is vital, but 
not for the counterpart and control is nonexistent for the former and abso- 
lute for the latter, with a similar time perspective the strategy for the weakest 
part will be to try to get the best deal his counterpart offers, but it should be 
clear that he has little influence. A long-term strategy would involve changing 
position of control: if a player currently has a non-existent level, over time 
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he can build and reinforce his position Another strategy would be to get a 
substitute product to reduce the level of dependence on the product and so 
make it less vital On the other hand, in a position of total control, when the 
product is trivial for the player and vital to his counterpart, and with a pers- 
pective of short-term time but long-term for the counterpart, the strategy 
should be to protect the position  
Mns provides not only a clear view of the stage where a negotiator might 
find himself, but it also gives clarity on the level of each of the factors and 
what would be required to improve the position This model helps in a clear 
way to establish both the position of the counterpart and the negotiators’ 
and facilitates the establishment of strategies that are more effective and 
aimed at the weaknesses of each negotiation  
It is considered necessary to carry out deeper studies to empirically test 
the effectiveness of the model For further work we propose to study in 
different negotiating situations trying to predict the results based on the mo- 
del and then affirm or not its applicability after the real negotiation. A full 
model using utility functions has also been developed and will be presented 
elsewhere  
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